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Abstract
This paper reports two studies that investigated children’s conceptions of mental illness
using a naïve theory approach (Wellman & Gelman, 1992, 1998), drawing upon a conceptual
framework for analyzing illness representations which distinguishes between the identity, causes,
consequences, curability and timeline of an illness (Leventhal, Meyer, & Nerenz, 1980;
Leventhal, Nerenz, & Steele, 1984).  The studies utilised semi-structured interviewing and card
selection tasks to assess 6- to 11-year-old children’s conceptions of the causes and consequences
(Study 1) and the curability and timeline (Study 2) of different mental and physical
illnesses/ailments. The studies revealed that, at all ages, the children held coherent causal-
explanatory ideas about the causes, consequences, curability and timeline of both mental and
physical illnesses/ailments. However, while younger children tended to rely on their knowledge of
common physical illnesses when thinking about mental illnesses, providing contagion and
contamination explanations of cause, older children demonstrated differences in their thinking
about mental and physical illnesses. No substantial gender differences were found in the
children’s thinking. It is argued that children hold coherent conceptions of mental illness at all
ages, but that mental illness only emerges as an ontologically distinct conceptual domain by the
end of middle childhood.
Keywords: illness representations, mental illness, physical illness, cognitive development, naïve
theory.
Children’s Conceptions of Mental Illness: A Naïve Theory Approach
There has been relatively little empirical work that has specifically investigated children’s
conceptions of mental illness in comparison to the large body of work that has investigated adults’
conceptions.  Understanding children’s thinking about mental health problems may not only aid in
communication with children in providing age-appropriate explanations of mental illness, but also
inform interventions into stigma reduction.
Research into children’s mental illness concepts indicates that children often incorrectly
attribute behaviours such as suicidal behaviour, hostility and aggression, and self-abusive
behaviours to the mentally ill (de Rosa, 1987; Poster, Betz, Mckenna, & Mossar, 1986).  Studies
have also found developmental trends in children’s thinking (e.g., Conant & Budoff, 1983;
Dollinger, Thelen, & Walsh, 1980; Royal & Roberts, 1987; Spitzer & Cameron, 1995; Weiss,
1985).  This research, which has investigated children from age 6 to 18, has revealed that younger
children tend to confuse mental and physical illness, and are less able to describe specific
characteristics of mental illness, whereas older children are more able to conceptualise mental
illness as a disturbance of thought and emotion, and have a broader understanding of treatment
(Wahl, 2002).
It has also been found that children at even the earliest ages studied, 6 and 7 years, have
negative attitudes towards the mentally ill.  They perceive the mentally ill as less attractive than
individuals with other disabilities, want greater social distance from individuals with mental
health problems, and rate such individuals less positively (e.g., Poster et al., 1986; Weiss, 1986;
1994; Wilkins & Velicer, 1980).  Furthermore, most studies have found that children’s attitudes
towards the mentally ill become more negative with age (Royal & Roberts, 1987; Weiss, 1986,
1994).  Findings are less clear in terms of gender differences. While some studies report
differences between girls’ and boys’ conceptions of mental illness, with girls tending to normalise
the behaviour (Marsden & Kalter, 1976), and showing greater compassion and social acceptance
towards the mentally ill compared to boys (Ross & Ashok, 1983), other studies have failed to find
any gender differences in understanding or attitudes (e.g., Coie & Pennington, 1976; Novak,
1974).
Much of the existing research with children (e.g., Ross & Ashok, 1983; Weiss, 1986,
1994), however, has neglected to investigate either the linguistic terms which children themselves
use spontaneously to refer to mental illness, or children’s comprehension of the diverse range of
linguistic terms (e.g., ‘mentally ill’, ‘mental disorder’, ‘emotionally disturbed’, etc.) which have
been employed in different studies to investigate children’s understanding of, and attitudes
towards, mental illness. This raises questions not only about the comparability of findings across
studies, but also about the validity of the findings obtained with terms that may not have been
within children’s own receptive or productive vocabularies.  Furthermore, it raises issues around
communication with children regarding mental illness, in terms of the use of age-appropriate
explanations of mental health problems.
While there has been comparatively little research into children’s thinking about mental
illness, there has been continued research into children’s understanding of physical illness (e.g.,
Bibace & Walsh, 1980; Buchanan-Barrow, Bati, & Barrett, 2003, 2004; Hergenrather &
Rabinowitz, 1991; Inagaki, 1997; Kalish, 1997; Perrin & Gerrity, 1981; Siegal, 1988; Siegal &
Peterson, 1999).  Among this body of research, some studies (e.g., Goldman, Whithney-Saltiel,
Granger, & Robin, 1991; Paterson, Moss-Morris, & Butler, 1999) have utilised an analytic
framework drawn from the study of adults’ understanding of physical illnesses.  This framework,
which was originally developed by Leventhal and colleagues (Leventhal et al., 1980, 1984), draws
conceptual distinctions between five components of adults’ cognitive representations of illnesses:
1) identity: knowledge of the label and of the symptomatic properties that are associated with an
illness; 2) cause: beliefs about the factors which bring about or trigger the illness; 3) timeline:
beliefs about the temporal duration of the illness course and whether the illness is acute or
chronic; 4) consequences: beliefs about the short-term or long-term effects or outcomes which
occur during or after the illness; and 5) curability: beliefs about whether or not, and how, an
individual can recover from the illness. All five components have been found to characterise
adults’ illness representations (Lau & Hartman, 1983; Leventhal et al., 1980, 1984).
Studies that have utilised this framework for studying children’s thinking about physical
illness have found it useful.  For example, Goldman et al. (1991) found that children aged 4- to 6-
years did understand a common illness (cold/fever) in terms of the five components.  Similarly,
Paterson et al. (1999) examined the concepts of colds and asthma in 7- to 14-year-olds with and
without asthma.  Differences were found in the children’s understandings of the various illness
components, whereby children with asthma showed greater knowledge of the causes, timeline and
the control/curability of asthma than children without asthma.  This model of illness
representations has not yet been employed to explore children’s thinking about mental illness, and
given its usefulness in studying children’s understanding of physical illness, the two studies
reported in the present paper adopted Leventhal’s framework to study children’s understanding of
mental rather than physical illnesses.
In addition, the design of the present research was informed by the naïve theory approach
to children’s cognitive development (Wellman, 1990; Wellman & Gelman, 1992, 1998).  This
approach postulates that children’s understanding develops through the construction of naïve or
intuitive theories, which themselves are subject to change as a result of the acquisition of new
evidence or information, and so may be subsequently refined and reformulated during the course
of development into more specific and/or qualitatively different theories.  Crucially, these naïve
theories enable the child to interpret, explain and make predictions about the phenomena falling
within a particular domain, and are based around the child’s construction of ontological
distinctions, patterns of coherence across phenomena, and causal-explanatory frameworks
(Wellman, 1990).  That is to say, this approach proposes that children recognise that knowledge
domains can differ fundamentally due to the fact that they contain very different types of
conceptual content relating to qualitatively different types of entities in the world; in other words,
it proposes that children have an understanding of basic ontological distinctions. This approach
also proposes that children’s beliefs about the phenomena which fall within a particular domain
are rational and cohere into connected networks of reasoning, and that children utilise distinctive
causal-explanatory principles when reasoning and making predictions about these phenomena.
Thus, the child is viewed as a naïve theorist, constructing, elaborating and sometimes revising
theories that are specialised for explaining the qualitatively different types of phenomena which
occur within different conceptual domains.
In the field of children’s understanding of physical illness, and consistent with the naïve
theory argument, it has been found that children do indeed construct coherent causal-explanatory
theories about physical illnesses, with these theories being influenced by the specific knowledge
which children acquire (Sigelman, Maddock, Epstein, & Carpenter, 1993).  Developmental
differences in children’s causal-explanatory theories of physical illness have also been found, with
older children demonstrating more accurate and differentiated reasoning (e.g., Hergenrather &
Rabinowitz, 1991).  However, while this body of research supports a naïve theory interpretation of
children’s understanding of physical illness, there have been no investigations to date of
children’s conceptions of mental illness utilising this theoretical perspective on children’s
cognitive development.  For this reason, the present studies were designed to apply the naïve
theory perspective specifically to children’s understanding of mental illness.
Thus, first, the present research aimed to make a theoretical contribution to the field,
through its novel use of the naïve theory perspective to investigate children’s conceptions of
mental illness, focusing in particular on their conceptions of the illness representation components
identified by Leventhal et al. (1980, 1984).  Second, the research aimed to address methodological
problems with existing studies into children’s conceptions of mental illness in relation to
linguistic terminology and unassisted verbal reporting.  In order to do so, a preceding focus group
study was carried out, to establish a reliable comprehensible vocabulary regarding mental illness
for children aged between 5 and 11 years.  This generated appropriate linguistic terminology,
vignettes and response categories to utilise in the main studies.
Thirty six children took part in six focus groups; two focus groups for each age group were
conducted (5- to 7-year-olds; 8- to 9-year-olds; 10- to 11-year-olds).  Three of the focus groups
explored children’s understanding of terms such as ‘crazy’, ‘mad’ and ‘mentally ill’, including
specific diagnostic labels such as ‘depression’, ‘dementia’ and ‘anorexia’, while the other three
presented children with vignettes describing symptoms of various specific mental illnesses.
Discussions were broadly structured around the Leventhal five-component model: identity, cause,
consequence, curability and timeline.  Children were encouraged to discuss freely, and children of
all ages contributed to the discussions.
Findings suggested that it would maximise children’s performance in the main studies if
they were presented with a combination of both diagnostic labels and vignettes describing specific
behavioural symptoms of mental illnesses (rather than using general terms relating to individuals
with mental health problems, or diagnostic labels alone).  Furthermore, it was found that the
vignettes presented to children in the focus group study were appropriate to utilise in their current
form, even for the youngest children.  The discussions also aided development of the card
selection tasks incorporated into the semi-structured interviews planned for the main studies,
which aimed to minimise problems associated with unassisted verbal reporting.  In the main
studies, children were asked to select their responses to questions from a series of cards that
provided a wide range of possible responses.  The response categories and the particular words
which were written on the cards were generated directly from the children’s responses to the
vignettes and questions in the focus group study.  This ensured that the words on the cards, and
hence the children’s responses, utilised linguistic terminology that was appropriate for children of
the age range being tested.  Full details of these preliminary focus group studies are reported in
Fox (2005).
Two separate main studies were conducted, as it was judged that examining all the
different components together within a single study might overload the children’s processing
capacities, particularly the younger children’s.  In addition, between them, the two studies aimed
to examine: 1) children’s conceptions of ontological distinctions, by investigating whether they
differentiated between mental and physical illnesses/ailments as two separate domains; 2) the
coherence of children’s thinking about mental and physical illnesses/ailments; 3) children’s ability
to construct causal explanations of mental and physical illnesses/ailments.
Children’s thinking about the causes and consequences of illnesses were investigated in
Study 1, while their thinking about the curability and timeline of illnesses were investigated in
Study 2. Their thinking about the identity of illnesses was not assessed as such, as the
methodology required information about the labels and the symptomatic properties of different
illnesses to be presented to the children by the experimenter. Thus, all children were provided
with exactly the same clinically accurate information about each of the illnesses before they were
questioned concerning causes, consequences, curability and timeline.
Based on previous studies, it was expected that, across this age range, the children would
show developmental differences in their conceptions of both mental illness (Conant & Budoff,
1983; Dollinger et al., 1980; Royal & Roberts, 1987; Spitzer & Cameron, 1995; Weiss, 1985) and
physical illness/ailment (Hergenrather & Rabinowitz, 1991; Inagaki, 1997; Kalish, 1997; Perrin &
Gerrity, 1981; Siegal, 1988; Siegal & Peterson, 1999). Associations with gender were also
investigated to try and clarify the mixed findings in the existing literature (cf. Coie & Pennington,
1976; Marsden & Kalter, 1976; Novak, 1974; Ross & Ashok, 1983).
Study 1: Causes and Consequences
Method
Design
The study employed a 3 (age) x 2 (gender) x 6 (illness) mixed design, with independent
groups on the first two factors and repeated measures on the final factor.
Participants
Children were recruited from three primary schools in Warwickshire, England.  The study
was conducted in accordance with the British Psychological Society’s ethical principles for
conducting research with human participants and the requirements of the University Ethics
Committee of the University of Surrey. Informed consent for the children to take part in the study
was given either by parents or by the headteacher acting in loco parentis. In addition, before
commencing each interview, the child was asked whether he or she wanted to take part in the
study and was given the option of withdrawing at any time.  The researcher was sensitive to
whether children appeared uncomfortable with participation; however, there were no children for
whom consent had been obtained who subsequently opted out.  Class teachers were asked to
select the specific children to participate such that children with a range of academic abilities
would take part in the study.
A total number of 122 children participated, with roughly equal numbers being
recruited from each school.  Children were divided into three groups: a ‘young’ group,
which comprised children from School Year 2 (6- to 7-year-olds; 21 girls and 19 boys; mean
age = 6.78; SD = 0.42); a ‘middle’ group of children from School Year 4 (8- to 9-year-olds;
20 girls and 20 boys; mean age = 8.78; SD = 0.42); and an ‘old’ group of children from
School Year 6 (10- to 11-year-olds; 21 girls and 21 boys; mean age = 10.83; SD = 0.38). 
 Materials
Materials consisted of two parts.  The first part comprised a vignette describing a principal
character diagnosed with a mental illness (depression, anorexia nervosa, dementia) or a physical
illness/ailment (chicken pox, broken arm, common cold).  As a previous study has shown little or
no prior experience of mental illness in children of this age group (Fox, 2005), the identity
component of Leventhal’s illness framework was explicitly given to the children as part of the
vignettes.  This allowed all of the children to be provided with identical and accurate information
about the name and the symptoms of the different mental and physical illnesses. The second part
of the materials consisted of the response cards, which were used in the card selection tasks, in
which the children were questioned about the causes and consequences of each illness.
The choice of the mental illness diagnoses was dictated by the mental health problems
focused upon by the Royal College of Psychiatrists’ Stigma Campaign (1998-2003) and also by
the need to control the age and gender of the principal characters in the vignettes.  A greater
number of females suffer from depression, anorexia nervosa and dementia (Alzheimer’s type)
than males (American Psychiatric Association, 1995).  As these are also all conditions that are
found in adults, it was decided to use an adult female character in all six vignettes.  The symptoms
for the mental illnesses in the vignettes were taken from the DSM IV (American Psychiatric
Association, 1995).  Physical illness/ailment diagnoses were chosen on the grounds that they were
common ailments, and symptoms were drafted with the assistance of a qualified medical
practitioner.  The six vignettes are shown in Appendix 1.
With reference to the response cards, the sets of responses which were presented to the
children, were generated directly from the responses that had been produced by the children in the
preceding focus group study.  Thus, the children were presented with a range of response options
that had been generated by other children of a similar age range (in which the causes and
consequences had been found to fall into the categories of psychological, physical/medical,
contagion/contamination and immanent justice). Children received a total number of 12 different
response cards (six causes and six consequences). These are shown in Appendix 2.  Cards each
measured 12 cm. in length and 6 cm. in width.  Words contained on the cards were typed in
capital letters in a clear bold black font.
Procedure
The response cards were shuffled by the researcher prior to the commencement of each
interview, so that each child was presented with a new randomly ordered set of cards, to control
for order effects and any possible response biases.  The order in which the mental and physical
illness/ailment diagnoses were presented to each child was also randomised. Children were
interviewed individually.  Each child was informed that the researcher would tell them a story
about some people with different sorts of illnesses, and that they would then be asked some
questions about the people in the stories using cards, and they would be asked to choose one of
the cards.  Children were also assured that their responses would be anonymous, and they were
told that they should choose whichever cards they felt to be right.
Children were then read a vignette describing an adult female diagnosed with the first
mental or physical illness/ailment.  Following the vignette, children were presented with a series
of cards inquiring about the most likely cause and consequence of the illness/ailment presented in
the vignette.  Children were asked about each of the components separately.  For each component,
the relevant set of cards was laid out on the table simultaneously, and all of the cards were read
aloud to make sure that the child understood what was written on them.  Once the experimenter
was sure that this was the case, the child was then asked to choose the most likely cause or
consequence of the mental or physical illness/ailment in question.  Children were presented with
causes and consequences cards in a counterbalanced order.  The chosen card was recorded.
Components were inquired about using the following questions: Causes: ‘How did this person
get……… ?’;  Consequences: ‘What will happen to this person because they have………?’. This
procedure was repeated for each of the six illness diagnoses in turn. All answers were documented
on a recording sheet.  The interviewer was alert to possible weaknesses in the children’s reading
skills, giving assistance and double-checking each chosen response with the child wherever
necessary.
Results
Children’s responses were recorded as frequencies which, for each illness individually,
were analysed using a 3 (age group) x 2 (gender) x 6 (response) hi log linear analysis, in order to
ascertain whether there were any significant associations between responses and either age or
gender.  Due to the low frequencies in some of the cells, these analyses are conservative
(Tabachnik & Fidell, 2006).
Children’s ontological distinctions
Children’s responses to causes associated with age group.   Significant associations
between children’s responses and their age group were found for depression ((2 (8) = 36.09, p <
0.01), anorexia nervosa ((2 (8) = 17.17, p < 0.05) and dementia ((2 (8) = 57.85, p < 0.01) (see
Table 1) but not for chicken pox, cold and broken arm.  Post hoc chi-squared analyses (see Table
1) showed that for depression, young children were more likely to choose ‘she caught it from
someone’ compared to middle and old children, who were more likely to choose ‘it’s to do with
how she thinks and feels’ than young children.  For anorexia nervosa, old children were more
likely to choose ‘it’s to do with how she thinks and feels’ than middle and young children.  For
dementia, young children were more likely to choose ‘she caught it’ compared to middle and old
children, who were more likely to choose ‘something is wrong with her brain’ compared to young
children.  For chicken pox and common cold, all children tended to choose ‘she caught it’, and for
broken arm, ‘she fell off her bike’.
Children’s responses to consequences associated with age group.  Significant associations
between children’s responses and their age group were found for depression ((2 (10) = 34.40, p <
0.01), anorexia nervosa ((2 (10) = 31.59, p < 0.01) and dementia ((2 (10) = 34.97, p < 0.01) (see
Table 2) but not for the physical illness/ailment diagnoses.  Post hoc analyses revealed that, for
depression, middle and old children were more likely to choose ‘help and support from relatives’
compared to young children, while the young children were more likely to choose ‘stay at home’
than old children.  For anorexia nervosa, old children were more likely to choose ‘have therapy’
compared to young children, and for dementia, young children were more likely to choose ‘see a
doctor’ compared to middle and old children, who were more likely to choose ‘have therapy’ than
young children.  For chicken pox and common cold, the majority of children chose ‘see a doctor’
and ‘stay at home’ as consequences, and for broken arm children tended to choose ‘see a doctor’
and ‘have an operation’.
The coherence of children’s causal-explanatory frameworks
In order to examine the coherence of the causal-explanatory frameworks (i.e., the cause-
consequence links) which underlay the children’s responses, and to ascertain the frequencies of
the various ‘types’ (i.e., specific pairs of particular causes-consequences), the data were subjected
to a configural frequency analysis (CFA).  CFA is a non-parametric, multivariate analysis of
association.  It identifies patterns of responses that are either over-represented (types) or under-
represented (anti-types), based on a null hypothesis that the patterns are normally and randomly
distributed (von-Eye, 1990).  Each cause and consequence card was allocated a number, giving
rise to 36 possible response patterns (profiles) for each mental and physical illness/ailment.  Each
child was allocated a response pattern based on their choice of cards for each mental and physical
illness/ailment.  For example, a child responding with ‘she ate something bad’ (cause) and ‘she
will need to see a doctor’ (consequences) would be allocated a response pattern of ‘2, 1’.
A number of types, which occurred significantly more frequently than would be expected
by chance, were identified.  More profiles were obtained for the mental illnesses than the physical
illness/ailment diagnoses.  Overall, the different profiles obtained for each mental and physical
illness/ailment highlighted commonality in the causes but variation in the consequences chosen
(see Table 3 for the profiles (types) identified for each of the mental and physical illness/ailment
diagnoses; the first number in the ‘profile’ column denotes the cause and the second the
consequence).  A hi log linear analysis showed a significant association between the children’s
response patterns and age for anorexia nervosa ((2 (10) = 23.67, p < 0.01) and dementia ((2 (8) =
53.98, p < 0.01).  For anorexia nervosa, old children were more likely to choose profile 4, 6
(cause: it’s to do with how she thinks and feels, consequence: she will need to have therapy) than
young and middle children.  For dementia, younger children were more likely to choose profiles
1,1 (cause: she caught it, consequence: see a doctor) and 5,1 (cause: something is wrong with her
brain, consequence: see a doctor), and older children were more likely to choose profiles 5,3
(cause: something is wrong with her brain, consequence: she will need to have an operation), 5,5
(cause: something is wrong with her brain, consequence: she will need help and support) and 5,6
(cause: something is wrong with her brain, consequence: she will need to have therapy).
Children’s responses associated with gender
The hi log linear analyses revealed very few significant associations between the
children’s responses and their gender.  However, significant associations between children’s
responses and gender were found for the consequences of depression ((2 (5) = 16.89, p < 0.01),
with boys being more likely to choose ‘stay at home’ than girls (35% vs. 24% respectively; z (1) =
2.35, p < 0.01), who were more likely to choose ‘she will need help and support from her
relatives’ than boys (74% vs. 52% respectively; (2 (1) = 3.66, p < 0.1).  It is noteworthy there were
no significant three-way associations between response, gender and age in any of the hi log linear
analyses.
Discussion
The findings of Study 1 suggest that between the ages of 6 and 11, there is little change in
children’s conceptions of the causes and consequences of broken arms, chicken pox and colds.
Age differences in their responses to depression, anorexia and dementia, however, suggest that
their conceptions of mental illness do change during these years. The children exhibited coherence
in the particular cause-consequence pairings that they produced, and while the pairings about the
mental illnesses became factually more accurate with age, even the youngest children did not
generate random pairings of causes and consequences, as shown by the results of the CFA.  It
should also be noted that the younger children appeared to rely on what they already knew about
common physical illnesses/ailments in order to reason about the mental illnesses (see the General
Discussion for a more detailed discussion of this point).
Study 2: Curability and Timeline
The second study was designed to explore the children’s understanding of the remaining two components of the Leventhal model,
namely the curability and timelines of different illnesses, using the same methodological approach as in Study 1.
Method
Design
This study also involved a 3 (age) x 2 (gender) x 6 (illness) mixed design, with
independent groups on the first two factors and repeated measures on the third factor.
Participants
Children were recruited from three primary schools in Warwickshire, England, which were
different from those in Study 1.  Recruitment of the children was carried out in the same way as in
Study 1.  Overall, 118 children took part, with roughly equal numbers of children from each
school.  Children were divided into the three same groups as Study 1; a ‘young’ group of children
from School Year 2 (6- to 7-year-olds; 19 girls and 20 boys; mean age = 6.38; SD = 0.49), a
‘middle’ group of children from School Year 4 (8- to 9-year-olds; 21 girls and 20 boys; mean age
= 8.41; SD = 0.50) and an ‘old’ group of children from School Year 6 (10- to 11-year-olds; 18
girls and 20 boys; mean age = 10.45; SD = 0.50).  
Materials
Children were presented with a vignette describing a principal character diagnosed with a
mental or physical illness/ailment, followed by a card selection task.  The mental illness diagnoses
presented to the children were identical to those used in Study 1.  However, to explore whether
children were reasoning about the mental and physical illnesses/ailments based on an ‘acute-
chronic’ criterion, for the physical illness/ailment conditions the children were presented with
asthma (a chronic illness) instead of common cold (an acute illness), in order to offer a contrast
with chicken pox and broken arm (acute illnesses/ailments).  The causes of the mental and
physical illnesses/ailments were also incorporated into the vignettes in order to hold the cause
constant for each individual illness while the children reasoned about its consequences, curability
and timeline. (See Appendix 1 for details of the vignettes.)
The second part of the materials consisted of the cards which were used in the card
selection tasks (see Appendix 2). To simplify the consequences task for the children, the number
of consequence cards was reduced from six to four. The four retained cards still represented a
range of different types of responses (medicalised, psychological and physical). However, ‘she
will have an operation’ was not retained, as one would first need to go and see a doctor in order to
have an operation, and an operation may therefore be viewed as a more serious consequence of an
illness.  The immanent justice consequence, ‘she will have to be nice to her friend’, was also not
retained, as this card had only been chosen by a minority of children in Study 1, almost entirely as
a consequence for depression.
Curability was investigated with ‘yes’ and ‘no’ cards. With respect to timeline, previous
work has shown that even young children (4- and 5-year-olds) recognise that there is a temporal
gap before recovery from an illness (Raman & Gelman, 2007).  Timeline cards for the present
study were generated directly from children’s responses in relation to timeline in the focus group
study.  The timeline categories were divided into: a relatively short-term recovery time of ‘less
than 1 month’, a middle-term recovery time of ‘1 month to 6 months’ and more long-term
recovery times of ‘6 months to 1 year’ and ‘more than 1 year’. There were therefore 10 different
response cards (four consequences, two curability, four timeline). These were of the same size and
contained the same kind of writing as had been used in the first study.
Procedure
The individual interviews were carried out in the same way as in Study 1; thus, each child
was interviewed individually and presented with new randomly ordered sets of cards.
Components were inquired about using the following questions: Consequences: ‘What will
happen to this person because they have………?’; Curability:  ‘Do you think this person
with……… can get better?’ ; Timeline:  ‘How long do you think it will take the person with………
to get better?’.  This process was repeated for each of the mental and physical illness/ailment
diagnoses in turn.  Children were questioned about these components in a random order.  Where
children were questioned about curability before timeline, and children responded ‘no’, they were
not then asked about timeline as this would have violated normal conversational pragmatics.
Results
Once again, data were analysed using hi log linear analyses in order to ascertain whether
there were any significant associations between responses and either age group or gender.
Children’s ontological distinctions
Children’s responses to consequences associated with age group.  Significant associations
between children’s responses and age group were found for depression ((2 (6) = 22.36, p < 0.01)
and anorexia nervosa ((2 (6) = 14.84, p < 0.05), but not for dementia or the physical
illnesses/ailments (see Table 4).  The significant results were followed up using post hoc chi-
squared tests.  These revealed that for depression, young children were more likely to choose ‘see
a doctor’ compared to old children, who were more likely to choose ‘have therapy’ compared to
children from both the young and middle age groups.  For anorexia nervosa, old children were
more likely to choose ‘have therapy’ compared to young children.  Although not significant,
frequencies for dementia indicated that younger children tended to choose ‘see a doctor’, while
older children tended to choose ‘help and support’.  For the physical illnesses/ailments, none of
the hi log linear analyses was significant, with the children tending to choose ‘see a doctor’
irrespective of age group.
Children’s responses to curability/timeline associated with age group.  For the purpose of
analysis, curability and timeline were pooled by incorporating the curability category ‘no’ as a
‘never’ timeline category when coding the data, yielding five response categories in total.
Significant associations with children’s responses and their age group were found for depression
((2 (6) = 31.95, p < 0.01), anorexia nervosa ((2 (6) = 20.94, p < 0.01), dementia ((2 (6) = 14.07, p <
0.05) and broken arm ((2 (6) = 15.40, p < 0.05), but not for chicken pox or asthma (see Table 5).
For depression, young children were more likely to choose ‘less than 1 month’ compared to
middle and old children, who were more likely to choose ‘1 month to 6 months’ as a recovery
time compared to young children.  For anorexia nervosa, young children were more likely to
choose ‘less than 1 month’ compared to old children, whereas old children were more likely to
choose ‘more than 1 year’ compared to both young and middle children.  For dementia, young
children were more likely to choose ‘less than 1 month’, ‘1 month to 6 months’ and ‘6 months to
1 year’ than old children, whereas old children were more likely to choose ‘never’ compared to
young and middle children.  For broken arm, old children were more likely to choose ‘6 months to
1 year’ than young children.  The frequencies indicated that, for chicken pox, the majority of
children tended to respond that the principal character would recover in less than 1 month, and for
asthma, never.
The coherence of children’s causal-explanatory frameworks
CFA was again employed to examine the causal-explanatory frameworks (i.e., the
consequence-curability/timeline links) which underlay the children’s responses, and to ascertain
the frequencies of the various ‘types’ (consequences-curability/timelines).
Children’s consequence-curability/timeline profiles.  A number of ‘types’ were identified,
highlighting commonality in the consequences but variation in the curability/timelines chosen.
For each of the mental and physical illnesses/ailments, with the exception of dementia and
chicken pox, children chose the same consequence but different curability/timelines.  For
example, children responding to the depression vignette tended to choose the consequence ‘have
therapy’, but curability/timelines ranged from ‘less than 1 month’ to ‘6 months to 1 year’ (see
Table 6 for the profiles (types) identified for each mental and physical illness/ailment diagnosis;
the first number in the ‘profile’ column denotes the consequence and the second the
curability/timeline).  A hi log linear analysis found a significant association between the
children’s response patterns and their age for depression ((2 (4) = 14.22, p < 0.01) and anorexia
nervosa ((2 (4) = 16.18, p < 0.01).  For depression, young and middle children were more likely to
choose profile 4, 1 (consequence: she will need to have therapy, timeline: less than 1 month) than
old children, who were more likely to choose profile 4, 2 (consequence: she will need to have
therapy, timeline: 1 month to 6 months) than young children.  For anorexia nervosa, young
children were more likely to choose profile 2, 2 (consequence: see a doctor, timeline: 1 month to 6
months) than old children.
Children’s responses associated with gender
The hi log linear analyses revealed significant associations between children’s responses
and gender for the timeline/curability of chicken pox ((2 (3) = 13.00, p < 0.01) and broken arm
((2 (3) = 13.45, p < 0.01).  Post hoc chi-squared tests revealed that girls were more likely to
choose ‘less than 1 month’ as a recovery time compared to boys for chicken pox (93% vs. 75%
respectively; (2 (1) = 5.88, p < 0.05) and broken arm (33% vs. 13% respectively; (2 (1) = 5.25, p <
0.05), while for broken arm boys were more likely to choose ‘more than 1 year’ than girls (12%
vs. 2% respectively; z (1) = 1.77, p < 0.05).  Once again, there were no significant three-way
associations between responses, age group and gender in the hi log linear analyses.
Discussion
The findings of Study 2 suggest that between the ages of 6 and 11, the children had
developmentally consistent conceptions of the consequences and curability/timeline of physical
illnesses/ailments such as chicken pox, common cold and broken arm.  However, their
conceptions of the consequences and curability/timeline of the mental illnesses of depression,
anorexia and dementia changed within this time period.  Findings also indicated coherence in
children’s thinking in the particular consequence-curability/timeline pairings that they produced.
This was true for even the youngest children who took part, although their patterns of paired
consequences-curability/timelines about the mental illnesses appeared to become more factually
accurate with age.  The findings also indicated that the children at all ages distinguished between
acute and chronic illnesses, as they provided different recovery times for asthma (a chronic
illness) from that of chicken pox (an acute illness).  Finally, it should be noted that the children’s
responses indicated that, when reasoning about mental illnesses, the younger children tended to
rely on their existing knowledge about common physical illnesses/ailments, a point which will be
expanded upon in the General Discussion below.
General Discussion
The present studies addressed methodological concerns with existing work and utilised the
naïve theory approach to investigate age and gender differences in 6- to 11-year-old children’s
thinking about mental illness, focusing in particular on the children’s conceptions of the illness
representation components identified by Leventhal et al. (1980, 1984).  Overall, the two studies
found differences associated with age in the children’s conceptions of mental illness.  Younger
children tended to provide similar responses to the mental and physical illnesses/ailments,
whereas older children did not, providing different responses to the mental vs. physical
illnesses/ailments.  One of the principal features which differentiated the thinking of the younger
and older children about mental illness was that, with increasing age, there was a reduction in the
number of children offering contagion or contamination responses for causes, and medicalised
responses for consequences and curability/timelines.  These differences were also reflected in the
patterns of paired causes-consequences (Study 1) and consequences-curability/timelines (Study 2)
produced for the mental and physical illness/ailment diagnoses.  For example, younger children
were more likely to choose ‘she caught it’ (cause) and ‘see a doctor’ (consequence) as a profile for
dementia than older children.  Older children, on the other hand, were more likely to choose, for
example, ‘it’s to do with how she thinks and feels’ (cause) and ‘have therapy’ (consequence) as a
profile for anorexia nervosa than younger children.
These results indicate that the children held coherent causal-explanatory conceptions of
both mental and physical illnesses at all ages, but that the factual accuracy of their thinking about
the mental illnesses improved with age, and that explanations for mental illnesses became
increasingly differentiated from explanations for physical illnesses/ailments with age.  That is not
to say that at age 11 the children’s conceptions had reached ceiling level.  Their knowledge may
still undergo further development after this age.  Nevertheless, mental illness appears to emerge as
an ontologically distinct conceptual domain by the end of middle childhood, in which mental
illness is no longer conceptualised in the same kind of medicalised way as physical illness.
Furthermore, it is notable that the children exhibited a considerable degree of consensus
and commonality in their conceptions of physical illness, as only a small number of profiles
emerged for such illnesses in the CFAs.  No significant association of response pattern with age
for any of the physical illnesses/ailments was found, further supporting the view that children’s
representations of these physical illnesses/ailments are already formed in early childhood.  In
comparison, the children in both studies produced a greater number of profiles for the mental
illnesses, indicating less consensus in their thinking about mental as opposed to physical illness.
Furthermore, there was a lower level of consensus in the responses of the older children to the
consequences component compared to the other components. This was also evident in the
variation of children’s responses to the consequences component across both studies.  This is
perhaps not surprising, as consequences are more varied and open-ended in nature.  For example,
if an individual developed a common cold, there would be little debate that the person had caught
the illness and would recover in a very short period of time; however, in terms of the
consequences of having a cold, more than one possibility arises (e.g., the individual may stay at
home, or may go to see their doctor, etc.). These findings are consistent with previous research
that has suggested that children’s thinking about more complex and abstract aspects of illness,
such as consequences or prevention, develop more slowly than their thinking about more concrete
aspects such as cause or symptoms (Paterson et al., 1999).  Nevertheless, even these more varied
patterns were internally coherent, even in the younger children.
Children gain information about common physical ailments such as common colds,
chicken pox and influenza early on in their development, and it seems likely that this is their most
extensive exposure to information about illness (Lau & Harman, 1983).  Children’s early illness
experience is likely to inform them that illnesses are contagious, cured by the medical profession,
and are relatively short-lived.  This may lead them to regard newly encountered types of illness –
such as mental illness – as infectious and readily transmittable, treated through medical
intervention with a short recovery period (cf. Brown, Nassau, & Barone, 1990; Kister & Patterson,
1980).
The older children, however, held different conceptions of the causes, consequences,
curability and timeline of the mental vs. the physical illness/ailment diagnoses.  They did not
make predictions about mental illness based on what they knew about common physical ailments.
They appeared to believe that causation is not necessarily a result of contagion or contamination,
but may result from internal as well as external agents.  Hence, the older children in Study 1
included psychological factors as potential causes of the mental illnesses, suggesting a belief that
the mind can affect how a person feels, and that there is an interaction between mind and body.
This was also true for the consequences of the mental illness diagnoses.  The responses provided
by the older children in Study 1 and Study 2 suggested that they were no longer relying on a
medical model to explain the causes, consequences, curability and timeline of the mental illnesses
presented.  These findings suggest that it is during the course of middle childhood that the mental
illness domain becomes differentiated from the physical illness/ailment domain.
Although the errors that the younger children were making may have been based on their
own experience, they demonstrated conceptions of physical ailments which they may not have
directly experienced themselves, for example asthma and broken arms.  Wider exposure to
information about physical conditions through experiences of friends or family members, or open
discussion at school, may well have impacted on their conceptions of these illnesses.  Mental
illness may be equally well understood if openly discussed within the school environment using
age-appropriate terminology and methods such as storybooks.  This may aid in combating the
negative and rejecting response found in children by previous work towards the mentally ill (e.g.,
Poster et al., 1986; Weiss, 1986; 1994; Wilkins & Velicer, 1980).  
Although the two studies found clear differences associated with age in children’s
conceptions of the causes, consequences, curability and timeline of the mental illnesses, very few
differences were found in the children’s responses associated with gender.  Where gender
differences were found, girls tended to provide responses of a more caring and compassionate
nature. Hence, in Study 1, for the consequences of depression, girls were more likely than boys to
choose the consequence ‘she will need help and support from her relatives’.  This supports the
findings of previous work (Ross & Ashok, 1983) that girls show greater compassion towards
mental illness compared to boys.  However, relatively few gender differences were found (and
there were no interactions between age and gender in the data either), so gender does not appear to
play an especially significant role within this domain. 
There are some limitations of the present studies.  First, the majority of children who
participated in the research were English, white and from middle class backgrounds.  These
characteristics may limit the generalisability of the results to other populations.  Second, the
research only presented children with descriptions of adult female principal characters in the
vignettes.  Future studies should explore the conceptions of mental illness held by children from
other social class backgrounds and other national-cultural backgrounds, and should investigate
children’s conceptions of mental illness in characters with different characteristics, for example
‘adult male’ or ‘child’.  Furthermore, future research needs to examine the factors that might
influence the development of children’s conceptions of mental illness, for example parental
knowledge of and attitudes to mental health problems, and exposure to issues relating to mental
illness at school and in the mass media, to further aid the development of age-appropriate stigma
reduction programmes.
To conclude, the studies reported in this paper have both theoretical and applied
implications.  They demonstrate the usefulness of the Leventhal model in the investigation of
children’s conceptions of mental illness.  They revealed evidence of developmental trends in
children’s thinking about the causes, consequences, curability and timeline of mental illness,
whereby younger children tend to rely on a ‘medical model’ when reasoning about the novel
mental illnesses, while older children do not.  However, at all ages, the children demonstrated
causal-explanatory understandings of the causes, consequences, curability and timeline of mental
as well as physical illnesses, and were coherent in the responses that they gave.  The older
children provided evidence that mental and physical illnesses are ontologically distinct conceptual
domains by the end of middle childhood.  On a more applied note, the language that is used to
communicate with children of primary school age in relation to mental illness may be important
for fostering their understanding.  In adopting age-appropriate terminology, the present research
has not only overcome a methodological problem of previous studies, but has also helped to
identify a comprehensible language which may be used to communicate with children about
mental illness in an age-appropriate way in stigma reduction programmes.
References
American Psychiatric Association. (1995). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental
disorders (4th ed.): International version.  Washington, DC: Author.
Appleby, L., & Wessely, S.  (1988). Public attitudes to mental illness: The influence of the
Hungerford massacre.  Medicine, Science and the Law, 28 (4), 291-295.
Bibace, R., & Walsh, M. (1980). Development of children’s concepts of illness.
Pediatrics, 66, 912-917.
Borinstein, A. (1992). Public attitudes towards persons with mental illness.  Health
Affairs, 11 (3), 186-196.
Brockman, J., & D’Arcy, C. (1978). Correlates of attitudinal social distance toward the
mentally ill: A review and re-survey.  Social Psychiatry, 13, 69-77.
Brown, L., Nassau, J., & Barone, V. (1990). Differences in AIDS knowledge and attitudes
by grade level.  Journal of School Health, 60, 270-275.
Buchanan-Barrow, E., Bati, M., & Barrett, M. (2003). Children’s understanding of illness:
The generalisations of illness according to exemplar.  Journal of Health Psychology, 8 (6), 659-
670.
Buchanan-Barrow, E., Bati, M. & Barrett, M. (2004). Healthy and chronically ill
children’s generalisation of illness to biological and non-biological categories.  Infant and Child
Development, 13 (5), 435-450.
Chi, M., & Ceci, S. (1987). Content knowledge: Its role, representation and restructuring
in memory development.  In H. Reese (Ed.), Advances in child development and behaviour (vol
20, pp. 91-142).  New York: Academic Press.
Coie, J., & Pennington, B. (1976). Children’s perceptions of deviance and disorder.  Child
Development, 47, 407-413.
Conant, S., & Budoff, M. (1983). Patterns of awareness in children’s understanding of
disabilities.  Mental Retardation, 21, 119-125.
de Rosa, A. (1987).  The social representations of mental illness in children and adults.  In
S. Moscovici & W. Doise (Eds.) Current issues in European social psychology (vol 2, pp. 47-
138). New York: Cambridge University Press.
Dollinger, S., Thelen, M., & Walsh, M. (1980). Children’s conceptions of psychological
problems.  Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 9, 191-194.
Fox, C. (2005). Children’s representations of mental illness.  Unpublished PhD Thesis.
University of Surrey, Guildford.
Goldman, S., Whithney-Saltiel, D., Granger, J., & Robin, J. (1991). Children’s
representations of ’everyday’ aspects of health and illness.  Journal of Paediatric Medicine, 16,
747-766.
Hall, P., Brockington, I., Levings, J., & Murphy, C. (1993). A comparison of responses to
the mentally ill in two communities.  British Journal of Psychiatry, 162, 99-108.
Hergenrather, J., & Rabinowitz, M. (1991). Age-related differences in the organisation of
children’s knowledge of illness.  Developmental Psychology, 27, 952-959.
Inagaki, K. (1997, April). Endogenous variables mediating disease transmission.  Paper
presented at the Biennial meeting of the Society for Research in Child Development, Washington
D.C., USA.
Kalish, C. (1997). Children’s understanding of mental and bodily reactions to
contamination: What you don’t know can hurt you but cannot sadden you.  Developmental
Psychology, 33, 79-91.
Kister, M., & Patterson, C. (1980). Children’s conceptions of the causes of illness:
Understanding of contagion and use of immanent justice.  Child Development, 51, 839-846.
Lau, R., & Hartman, K. (1983). Common sense representations of common illnesses.
Health Psychology, 2, 167-185.
Leventhal, H., Meyer, D., & Nerenz, D. (1980). The Common sense representation of
illness danger.  In S. Rachman (Ed.), Medical psychology, (vol 2, pp. 7-30).  New York:
Pergamon.
Leventhal, H., Nerenz, D., & Steele, D. (1984). Illness representations and coping with
health threats.  In A. Baum & J. Dinger (Eds.) Handbook of psychology and health, (vol 4, pp.
221-252).  New York: Erlbaum.
Levey, S., & Howells, K. (1994). Accounting for the fear of schizophrenia.  Journal of
Community & Applied Social Psychology, 4, 313-328.
Link, B., & Cullen, F. (1986). Contact with the mentally ill and perceptions of how
dangerous they are.  Journal of Health and Social Behaviour, 27 (4), 289-302.
Marsden, G., & Kalter, N. (1976). Children’s understanding of their emotionally disturbed
peers; I the concept of emotional disturbance.  Psychiatry, 39, 227-238.
Novak, D. (1974). Children’s reactions to emotional disturbance in imaginary peers.
Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 42, 462.
Nunnally, J. (1961). Popular conceptions of mental health.  New York: Holt, Reinhart and
Winston.
Paterson, J., Moss-Morris, R., & Butler, S. (1999). The effect of illness experience and
demographic factors on children’s illness representations.  Psychology and Health, 14, 117-129.
Perrin, E., & Gerrity, P. (1981). There’s a demon in your belly: Children’s understanding
of illness.  Pediatrics, 67, 841-849.
Poster, E., Betz, C., Mckenna, A., & Mossar, M. (1986). Children’s attitudes towards the
mentally ill as reflected in human figure drawings and stories.  Journal of the American Academy
of Child Psychiatry, 25, 680-686.
Rabkin, J. (1974). Public attitudes toward mental illness: A review of the literature.
Schizophrenia Bulletin, 10, 9-33.
Raman, L. & Gelman, S. (2007). Children’s recognition of time in the causes and cures of
physical and emotional reactions to illnesses and injuries.  British Journal of Psychology, 98, 389-
410.
Ross, N., & Ashok, M. (1983). Adolescents’ attitudes towards mental illness: Relationship
between components and sex differences.  Social Psychiatry, 18, 45-50.
Royal College of Psychiatrists (1998-2003). Stigma campaign.  London: Royal College of
Psychiatrists.
Royal, G., & Roberts, M. (1987). Students’ perceptions of and attitudes toward
disabilities: A comparison of twenty conditions.  Journal of Clinical Child Psychology, 16, 122-
132.
Siegal, M. (1988). Children’s knowledge of contagion and contamination as causes of
illness.  Child Development, 59, 1353-1359.
Siegal, M., & Peterson, C. (1999). Children’s understanding of biology and health.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Sigelman, C., Maddock, A., Epstein, J., & Carpenter, W. (1993). Age differences in
understandings of disease causality: AIDS, colds and cancer.  Child Development, 64, 272-284.
Spitzer, A., & Cameron, C. (1995). School-age children’s perceptions of mental illness.
Western Journal of Nursing Research, 17(4), 398-415.
Tabachnick, B.G. & Fidell, L.S. (2006). Using Multivariate Statistics. New York, NY, US:
HarperCollins
Trute, B., Tefft, B., & Segall, A. (1989). Social rejection of the mentally ill: A replication
study of public attitude.  Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 24, 69-76.
von-Eye, A. (1990).  Introduction to configural frequency Analysis: The search for types
and anti-types in cross-classifications.  New York, NY, US: Cambridge University Press.
Wahl, O. (2002). Children’s views of mental illness: A review of the literature.
Psychiatric Rehabilitation Skills, 6, 134-158.
Weiss, M. (1985). Children’s attitudes towards mental illness as assessed by the Opinions
about Mental Illness Scale.  Psychological Reports, 57, 251-258.
Weiss, M. (1986). Children’s attitudes toward the mentally ill: A developmental analysis.
Psychological Reports, 58, 11-20.
Weiss, M. (1994). Children’s attitudes toward the mentally ill: An eight-year longitudinal
follow-up.  Psychological Reports, 74, 51-56.
Wellman, H. (1990). The child’s theory of mind.  Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Wellman, H., & Gelman, S. A. (1992). Cognitive development: Foundational theories of
core domains.  Annual Review of Psychology, 43, 337-375.
Wellman, H., & Gelman, S. A. (1998). Knowledge acquisition in foundational domains.
In W. Damon (Ed.), Handbook of child psychology, vol. 2: Cognition, perception and
language (pp. 523-573).  New York, US: John Wiley & Sons.
Wilkins, J. & Velicer, W. (1980). A semantic differential investigation of children’s
attitudes toward three stigmatized groups.  Psychology in Schools, 17, 364-371.
Table 1: Study 1: Cause of the mental illness analysed by age group
|        |Caught it          |Nasty to friend |Ate something   |Thinks and feels|Something wrong |Fell off her    |
|        |                   |                |bad             |                |with brain      |bike            |
|Mental illness*                                        |DPa                                                    |
Table 2: Study 1: Consequence of the mental illness analysed by age group
|        |See a doctor      |Stay at home     |Have an operation|Nice to friend in|Help and support |Have therapy     |
|        |                  |                 |                 |future           |from relatives   |                 |
|Mental illness*                                        |DP                                                     |
Table 3: Study 1: Profiles identified for each of the mental and physical illnesses/ailments
|Illness|Profile |Cause               |Consequence     |N    |Z       |
|a      |        |                    |                |     |        |
|DP     |3, 4    |Nasty to her friend |Nice to her     |12   |4.68*   |
|       |        |                    |friend          |     |        |
|       |4, 1    |Thinks and feels    |See a doctor    |12   |4.68*   |
|       |4, 5    |Thinks and feels    |Help and support|38   |18.80*  |
|       |4, 6    |Thinks and feels    |Have therapy    |19   |8.48*   |
|AN     |2, 1    |She ate s’thing bad |See a doctor    |9    |3.05*   |
|       |2, 3    |She ate s’thing bad |Have operation  |9    |3.05*   |
|       |4, 1    |Thinks and feels    |See a doctor    |24   |11.20*  |
|       |4, 3    |Thinks and feels    |Have operation  |18   |7.94*   |
|       |4, 5    |Thinks and feels    |Help and support|9    |3.05*   |
|       |4, 6    |Thinks and feels    |Have therapy    |12   |4.68*   |
|DM     |1, 1    |She caught it       |See a doctor    |9    |3.05*   |
|       |5, 1    |S’thing wrong       |See a doctor    |19   |8.48*   |
|       |        |w/brain             |                |     |        |
|       |5, 3    |S’thing wrong       |Have operation  |28   |13.37*  |
|       |        |w/brain             |                |     |        |
|       |5, 5    |S’thing wrong       |Help and support|25   |11.74*  |
|       |        |w/brain             |                |     |        |
|       |5, 6    |S’thing wrong       |Have therapy    |13   |5.22*   |
|       |        |w/brain             |                |     |        |
Table continues on next page /…
|BA     |6, 1    |She fell off bike   |See a doctor    |55   |26.95*  |
|       |6, 2    |She fell off bike   |Stay at home    |15   |5.22*   |
|       |6, 3    |She fell off bike   |Have operation  |46   |23.15*  |
|CP     |1, 1    |She caught it       |See a doctor    |68   |32.92*  |
|       |1, 2    |She caught it       |Stay at home    |36   |24.78*  |
|C      |1, 1    |She caught it       |See a doctor    |64   |35.10*  |
|       |1, 2    |She caught it       |Stay at home    |49   |17.72*  |
aDP = Depression, AN = Anorexia Nervosa, DM = Dementia, BA = Broken Arm, CP = Chicken Pox, C = Cold
*Significant at Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of 0.0014
Table 4: Study 2: Consequence of the mental illness analysed by age group
|        |See a doctor      |Stay at home    |Help and support |Have therapy     |
|        |                  |                |from relatives   |                 |
|Mental illness*                                        |
Table 5: Study 2: Curability/timeline of the mental illness analysed by age group
|        |Less than 1 month |1 month to 6     |6 months to 1 year|More than 1 year |Never              |
|        |                  |months           |                  |                 |                   |
|Mental illness*                                        |DPa                                                    |
Table 6: Study 2: Profiles identified for each of the mental and physical illnesses/ailments
|Illnessa    |Profile |Consequence  |Curability/Timeline|N   |Z      |
|DP          |4,1     |Have therapy |Less than 1 month  |14  |3.34*  |
|            |4,2     |Have therapy |1 month to 6 months|18  |4.98*  |
|            |4,3     |Have therapy |6 months to 1 year |18  |4.98*  |
|AN          |2,2     |See a doctor |1 month to 6 months|14  |3.34*  |
|            |2,3     |See a doctor |6 months to 1 year |17  |4.57*  |
|            |2,4     |See a doctor |More than 1 year   |14  |3.34*  |
|DM          |1,5     |Help and     |Never              |26  |8.28*  |
|            |        |Support      |                   |    |       |
|            |2,4     |See a doctor |More than 1 year   |14  |3.34*  |
|CP          |2,1     |See a doctor |Less than 1 month  |64  |23.92* |
|            |3,1     |Stay at home |Less than 1 month  |32  |10.75* |
|BA          |2,1     |See a doctor |Less than 1 month  |20  |5.80*  |
|            |2,2     |See a doctor |1 month to 6 months|56  |20.63* |
|            |2,3     |See a doctor |6 months to 1 year |14  |3.34*  |
|A           |2,4     |See a doctor |More than 1 year   |23  |7.04*  |
|            |2,5     |See a doctor |Never              |43  |15.27* |
aDP = Depression, AN = Anorexia Nervosa, DM = Dementia, CP = Chicken Pox, BA = Broken Arm, A = Asthma
*Significant at Bonferroni-adjusted alpha of 0.0025
Appendix 1: Vignettes presented to children
|Depression:                                                      |
|This is about a woman called* …… She has got Depression.  This   |
|means that she feels sad all of the time and doesn’t like to do  |
|the things that she usually does anymore.  She feels as if she   |
|has no energy and feels tired most of the time.  In general she  |
|thinks badly of herself and feels that she isn’t worth anything  |
|and blames herself when things go wrong.  She also finds it hard |
|to sleep.                                                        |
|Anorexia Nervosa:                                                |
|This is about a woman called* …… She has got Anorexia Nervosa.   |
|This means that she has lost a lot of weight and because of this |
|her life is now in danger.  She is frightened of putting on      |
|weight and even though she is very thin, she still says that she |
|is fat and needs to lose more weight.                            |
|Dementia (Alzheimer’s Type):                                     |
|This is about a woman called* …… She has got Dementia.  This     |
|means that she finds it hard to remember things and to learn new |
|information.  She finds it hard to get herself washed and dressed|
|in the morning and also needs help to eat, so someone has to feed|
|her.  She doesn’t recognise her family anymore and needs to be   |
|looked after all the time.                                       |
|Chicken Pox:                                                     |
|This is about a woman called* ……  She has got Chicken Pox.  This |
|means that she doesn’t feel very well and isn’t very hungry.  She|
|is covered in a rash of red spots that have got crusts that will |
|drop off.  The rash is very itchy so she has to try not to       |
|scratch the spots.                                               |
|Broken Arm:                                                      |
|This is about a woman called* ……  She has broken her arm.  This  |
|means that her arm is swollen and bruised and it really hurts    |
|when she tries to wiggle her fingers.                            |
|Common cold:                                                     |
|This is about a woman called* …… She has got a Cold.  This means |
|that she has a runny nose, a headache and a sore throat.  She    |
|feels chilly but she has a temperature and she has a cough.      |
|Causes Embedded in Vignettes in Study 2:                         |
|Depression: Her depression is caused by how she thinks and feels.|
|                                                                 |
|Anorexia Nervosa: Her anorexia is caused by how she thinks and   |
|feels.                                                           |
|Dementia (Alzheimer’s Type): She has dementia because there is   |
|something wrong with her brain.                                  |
|Chicken Pox: She got chicken pox because she caught it from her  |
|sister.                                                          |
|Broken Arm: She broke her arm when she fell off her bike.        |
|Illness presented in Study 2 instead of common cold:             |
|Asthma: This is about a woman called* …… She has got asthma.  She|
|has had asthma all her life.  This means that sometimes her chest|
|feels tight and she gets wheezy.  When this happens she finds it |
|hard to breathe and she coughs a lot.                            |
*The names Jane, Sarah, Ann, Mary, Susan and Rachel were chosen at random by the researcher in order to control for effects as a result of the
name given to the principal character in the vignette and to make it clear that each vignette was describing a different person.
Appendix 2: Response cards presented to children
|STUDY 1                           |                                   |
|Causes:                           |Consequences:                      |
|She caught it from someone        |She will need to see a doctor      |
|She ate something bad             |She will have therapy              |
|She was nasty to her friend       |She will need help and support from|
|It’s to do with how she thinks and|her relatives                      |
|feels                             |She will have to stay at home      |
|Something is wrong with her brain |She will have an operation         |
|She fell off her bike             |She will always have to be nice to |
|                                  |her friend in the future           |
|STUDY 2                           |                                   |
|Consequences:                     |Timeline:                          |
|She will need to see a doctor     |Less than 1 month                  |
|She will have therapy             |1 month to 6 months                |
|She will need help and support    |6 months to 1 year                 |
|from her relatives                |More than 1 year                   |
|She will have to stay at home     |                                   |
|Curability:                       |                                   |
|Yes                               |                                   |
|No                                |                                   |
